cvs commit: src/contrib/gcc protector.c protector.h Makefile.in calls.c combine.c cse.c explow.c expr.c flags.h function.c gcse.c integrate.c libgcc2.c loop.c optabs.c reload1.c toplev.c src/gnu/usr.bin/cc/cc_int Makefile

[Jeroen Ruigrok/asmodai]

-On [20031211 09:52], Matthew Dillon (dillon at xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote:
>    huh?  I don't think I understood a single word of this posting (!) :-)

As far as I understand it:

With Propolice you only disable smashing the stack.  What Propolice and
StackGuard and similar protections do is add a 'canary' (informer/decoy)
value just before the return addresses on the run-time stack.  Propolice
and StackGuard add additional code in your binary which then checks if
the canary value is present or not.  If it is not a buffer overflow has
occured.

Thing is that SEBP or SEIP still is available before or after the canary
value.  You can place shellcode on the heap and just jump there.

Hence OpenBSD also implemented W^X (Write XOR eXecutable).  This also
makes sure that memory get fine-grained permissions.  Which thus limits
executing in the stack and heap.

This is at least my understanding, I could of course be way off with my
interpretation.

-- 
Jeroen Ruigrok van der Werven <asmodai(at)wxs.nl> / asmodai / kita no mono
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